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SECURING LIBERTY WITH CHAINS: LOCKING UP THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT WITHIN THE CONFINES OF MIRANDA
DICKERSON V. UNITED STATES, 530 U.S. 428(2000)
Bryan P Doyle*
I. INTRODUCTION
The admissibility of a suspect's confessions in criminal proceedings has a long
and colorful history. Prior to the Miranda decision, the admissibility of a sus-
pect's confession was evaluated under a voluntariness test.' This test was devel-
oped by the common law after the courts in England recognized that coerced
confessions were inherently untrustworthy.2 Subsequently in the United States,
case law recognized two constitutional bases for the requirement that a confes-
sion be voluntary before it can be admitted into evidence.' These bases were the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."
For the middle third of the 20th century, the Supreme Court based the rule
against admitting involuntary confessions almost exclusively on notions of due
process.' The Court applied the due process test in 30 cases between 1936 and
1964, refining the test into an inquiry examining whether the suspect's will was
overborne by the circumstances surrounding his giving of the confession.6
According to the Supreme Court, the due process test considers "the totality of
all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation."7 The Court continued to apply the due process
"totality of the circumstances" test and to exclude confessions that were obtained
under coercion until 1964 when Malloy v. Hogan8 and subsequently in 1966,
Miranda v. Arizona,9 refocused the inquiry."° In Malloy, the Fifth Amendment
privilege, previously only applicable in federal proceedings, was applied to the
States.' Miranda focused the inquiry into how to protect the Fifth Amendment
right against compelled self-incrimination. After twenty-five years of interpreta-
tion of Miranda, some of which declared that it was not constitutionally
required, the Court was forced to decide whether Miranda was in fact constitu-
tionally required. If Miranda is constitutionally required, can there be any
* The author would like to thank Professor Judy Johnson for her support and guidance in the creation and com-
pletion of this project.
1. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432-33 (2000).




6. Id. at 433-34.
7. Id. at 434 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973)).
8. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. Dickerson, 580 U.S. at 434..
11. Id.
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exceptions to it? If it is not, then can the Supreme Court enforce Miranda s deci-
sion upon the States? These are the questions that Dickerson v. United States
12
attempted to deal with and somehow fell short of answering. Dickerson added
what seemed to be the final dimension to the Miranda decision-officially mak-
ing Miranda warnings a constitutional requirement.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. Pre-Miranda Holdings
In 1936, the United States Supreme Court decided in Brown v. Mississippi"
that coerced confessions violate the due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States." In Brown, the petitioners
were indicted for the murder of Raymond Stewart, pleaded not guilty, were
found guilty at trial, and then sentenced to death." Aside from the defendants'
confessions, there was no evidence sufficient to submit the case to the jury.16
The case involved three black males, who were suspects in the murder of
Raymond Stewart." The deputy sheriff and several others repeatedly hanged
and whipped one of the suspects in an attempt to get him to confess to the mur-
der. 8 A couple of days later, the deputy returned to the suspect's home and
arrested him and left to take the suspect to a jail in an adjoining county. 9 The
route which the deputy took led them through Alabama where the deputy
stopped the car and once again beat the suspect declaring that he would continue
the beatings until the suspect confessed. 2 The suspect then agreed to confess to
whatever statement that the deputy would dictate, and he did so, after which the
deputy transported the suspect to jail.2" The police also arrested the other two
suspects and took them to the same jail.22 On Sunday night, April 1, 1934, a
deputy and several other white men came to the jail and made these defendants
strip down and lie over chairs where their backs were cut to pieces with a leather
strap with buckles on it.23 The deputy made the demand that the defendants con-
fess in every matter of detail as demanded by those present or the whippings
would continue. 24 The defendants confessed to the crime, and as the whippings
continued, the defendants adjusted their confession in all details so as to conform
to the demands of their torturers.25
12. 580 U.S. 428. (2000).
13. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
14. Id. at 279.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 281-82.
18. Id. at 281.
19. Id.
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Once the confessions had been obtained in exactly the form required by the
mob, the defendants were warned that if they changed their story at any time,
then the same punishment would be inflicted on them again.26 On the next day,
two sheriffs accompanied by eight other persons came to the jail where all three
defendants were housed to "hear the free and voluntary confession of these mis-
erable and abject defendants. '27 Those present went through the farce of hearing
the "free and voluntary" confessions of the defendants. The two sheriffs and one
other person present were the three witnesses used in court to establish the so-
called confessions, which were received in court as evidence over the objections
of the defense counsel.
28
The sole evidence upon which the convictions were obtained was these so-
called confessions. 29 According to the Court, "[w]ithout this evidence, a peremp-
tory instruction to find for the defendants would have been inescapable."3 The
defendants were put on the stand, and they fully developed the facts and details
of the manner by which the police had obtained the confessions." There was no
dispute with regard to the facts of the manner in which the confessions were
obtained from the defendants. 2
The defendants appealed to the state supreme court, claiming that it was error
to admit their confessions because they were obtained by coercion and brutality
known to the court and to the district attorney.3 The state supreme court
affirmed the admission of the confessions, however. 4 The defendants then
moved for a new trial on the ground that the police had obtained all the evidence
against them by coercion and brutality known to the court and to the district
attorney, and that the defendants had been denied the benefit of counsel.3 The
defendants asserted that allowing the coerced confessions into evidence against
them violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States.3 The state court considered the federal ques-
tion and entertained the suggestion of error, and then decided it against the
defendants. 7 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that by admitting the coerced confessions, the state court "denied a federal right
fully established and specially set up and claimed."'
In 1936 when Brown was decided, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination did not apply to the states. In reaching its decision, the Court
examined the State's contention based on Twining v. New Jersey" that "exemp-
26. Id.
27. Id. at 282-83.
28. Id. at 283.
29. Id. at 284.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 285.
33. Id. at 279-80.




38. Id. at 287.
39. 211 U.S. 78(1908).
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tion from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the states is not secured
by any part of the Federal Constitution."4  Because the Fifth Amendment did
not apply to the states at the time, the only question to consider was whether the
police conduct amounted to a due process violation under the Fourteenth
Amendment, which did apply to the states. According to the Court, "[t]he state
is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own concep-
tions of policy, unless in so doing it 'offends some principle of justice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."' 1
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "No State shall. . . deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 2
The Court stated that "the freedom of the state in establishing its policy is the
freedom of constitutional government and is limited by the requirement of due
process of law."' In essence, states can regulate their own processes, but there
are certain fundamental rights-among these the Fourteenth Amendment right to
due process-that cannot be infringed upon. Citing Moore v. Dempsey," the Court
stated that "[t]he rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness
stand."4 The state may not permit an accused to be sent to a rapid conviction
under "mob domination" without supplying corrective process. 6 The Court also
noted that a state may "not contrive a conviction through the pretense of a trial
which in truth is 'but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through
a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known
to be perjured.'" 47
The Court went on to describe a trial as a pretense. According to the Court,
[T]he trial... is a mere pretense where the state authorities have contrived a con-
viction resting solely upon confessions obtained by violence. The due process
clause requires 'that state action, whether through one agency or another, shall
be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions.'
The Court considered the methods used to procure the confessions in Brown as
"revolting,"49 and that the use of the confessions as the basis for conviction and
sentence was "a clear denial of due process."5
40. Brown, 297 U.S. at 285 (quoting Twining, 211 U.S. at 114); See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934) (stating that "the privilege against self-incrimination may be withdrawn and the accused put
upon the stand as a witness for the state").
41. Id. (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105).
42. US. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
43. Brown, 297 U.S. at 285.
44. 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923).
45. Brown, 297 U.S. at 285-86.
46. Id. at 286 (citing Moore, 261 U.S. at 91).
47. Id. (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)).
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For the thirty years following Brown, the Court applied the due process "totality
of the circumstances test" examining the characteristics of the accused and the
details surrounding the interrogation."1 The cases applying the voluntariness test
focused on whether a defendant's will was overborne by the circumstances sur-
rounding the giving of the confession. 2 It was not until the 1960s that the
Supreme Court began to look at the due process clause and determine its elements.
In the 1964 case of Malloy v. Hogan3 the United States Supreme Court was
asked to reconsider earlier decisions such as the decisions in Brown and in
Twining, which held that the privilege against self-incrimination is not safe-
guarded against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 Brown was the
first case where the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause prohibited the States from using an accused's compelled confession
against him. 5 In the light of Twining, the Brown Court felt impelled to hold that
its decision did not involve the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. "Compulsion by torture to extort a confession is a different matter." 7
However, by the time of Malloy, this distinction had long been abandoned. 5
In Malloy the petitioner was arrested during a gambling raid by the Hartford,
Connecticut, police. 9 He pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor of pool selling and
was sentenced to one year in jail and a fine of $500.0 The court ordered the sen-
tence suspended after 90 days at which time the petitioner was to be placed on a
two-year probation." Sixteen months after his guilty plea, the petitioner was
ordered to testify before a referee appointed by the Superior Court of Hartford
County to inquire into alleged gambling and other criminal activities. 2 The ref-
eree asked the petitioner several questions all of which the petitioner refused to
answer on the grounds that answering them may lead to self-incrimination.
63
The Superior Court held the petitioner in contempt and placed him in prison until
he was willing to answer the questions.64
Affirming a denial of a writ of habeas corpus, the Connecticut Supreme Court
of Errors held that a witness in a state proceeding was not entitled to the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, that he was not covered by any
privilege of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the petitioner "had not proper-
ly invoked the privilege available under the Connecticut Constitution."5 The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
51. Dickerson v. United States, 580 U.S. 428, 434 (2000).
52. Id.
53. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citation omitted).
58. Id. at 6-7.
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does guarantee the petitioner the Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination. 6
The Court noted that at the time of Malloy the admissibility of a confession in
a state criminal prosecution was tested by the same standard applied in federal
prosecutions since 1897. The test was set forth in Bram v. United States68
which held that
[i]n criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises
whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is con-
trolled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself."69
According to the Court, under this test, the constitutional inquiry was "not
whether the conduct of state officers in obtaining the confession was shocking,
but whether the confession was 'free and voluntary."' 7 To be free and voluntary,
the confession must not have been obtained by any sort of violence or threats,
nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, nor by the exertion of improper
influence." The Court in Malloy noted that it had held inadmissible confessions
"secured by so mild a whip as the refusal, under certain circumstances, to allow a
suspect to call his wife until he confessed."72
The standard of admissibility began to shift to the federal standard in state
cases with Lisenba v. California73 where the Court spoke of the choice of the
accused to deny, admit, or refuse to answer.74 The Court in Malloy stated that the
Fifth Amendment privilege is the essential mainstay of the accusatorial nature of
the American system of criminal prosecution." As a result, federal and state
governments are constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence that
has been independently and freely secured." Likewise, the government cannot
by coercion prove a charge against the accused out of his own mouth.77
Applying this reasoning to Malloy, the Court held that since the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the States from inducing a person to confess by means
"far short of 'compulsion by torture,' it follows a fortiori that it also forbids the
States to resort to imprisonment, as here, to compel him to answer questions that
66. id.
67. Id. at 7.
68. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
69. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7 (citing Brain, 168 U.S. at 542).
70. Id.
71. Id. (citations omitted).
72. Id (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963)).
73. 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
74. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7 (citing Lisenba, 314 U.S. at 241).
75. Id. (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961)).
76. Id. at 8.
77. id.
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might incriminate him."78 According to the Court, in response to the claim that
"the availability of the federal privilege to a witness in a state inquiry is to be
determined according to a less stringent standard than is applicable in a federal
proceeding,"79 what is accorded is a privilege of refusing to incriminate oneself,
and the feared prosecution may be by either state or federal authorities.8" The
Court reasoned that, "[i]t would be incongruous to have different standards
determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecu-
tion, depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court."8
The same standards, therefore, must determine the justification of an accused's
silence in either a state or federal proceeding.82
Thus, with Malloy, the Supreme Court began to apply the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination to the states bolstering the Fourteenth
Amendment due process requirement. The Court's reasoning in Malloy "made
clear what had already become apparent-that the substantive and procedural safe-
guards surrounding admissibility of confessions in state cases had become
exceedingly exacting, reflecting all the policies embedded in the privilege."83
Malloy indicates that the voluntariness doctrine in state cases reaches to all inter-
rogation practices which may exert a disabling pressure upon an individual,
causing him to make a confession apart from free and rational choice.8"
B. The Fifth Amendment and Miranda v. Arizona.
Following Malloy, the Court still had to deal with safeguarding the con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination in cases where the interrogation
practices were so inherently coercive as to subject the suspect to possible invol-
untary confession. In Miranda v. Arizona8" the Court dealt with "the admissibil-
ity of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police
interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is
accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be
compelled to incriminate himself."88 According to.Miranda, rather than being
physically oriented, the modem practice of in-custody interrogation is psycho-
logically oriented. "Interrogation still takes place in privacy. Privacy results in
secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes
on in interrogation rooms. '"88 The Miranda Court recognized that this private
interrogation can, in and of itself, exact "a heavy toll on individual liberty and
[trade] on the weakness of individuals."8 Coercion can be mental. Miranda
78. Id. (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 10.
80. Id. at 11. (citation omitted).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463-64 (1966).
84. Id. at 464-65.
85. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
86. Id. at 439.
87. Id. at 448.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 455.
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relied on police procedure manuals which recommend various interrogation tac-
tics such as the aforementioned privacy, demonstrations of hostility, and even
trickery." Often the sheer weight of the investigator's personality will be the
deciding factor in eliciting a confession. 1 "Where emotional appeals and tricks
are employed to no avail, he must rely on an oppressive atmosphere of dogged
persistence."92
In Miranda, the police arrested the defendant and took him to an interrogation
room where he confessed to the kidnapping and forcible rape of an 18-year-old
girl. 3 At the time of his confession, Miranda was a 23-year-old uneducated indi-
gent suffering from an emotional illness "of the schizophrenic type."94 He was
"'alert and oriented as to time, place, and person,'.., and sane within the legal
definition."9 Questioning was brief, conducted during the day, and "unmarked
by any of the traditional indicia of coercion."96 There was, in sum, "a legitimate
purpose, no perceptible unfairness, and certainly little risk of injustice in the
interrogation."97 Yet, the Court held the confession inadmissible because
although the defendants' confessions were not involuntary in traditional terms,
the Court was concerned with safeguarding the Fifth Amendment rights.9 In
none of the cases consolidated in the Miranda decisions9 did the police officers
try to offer appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that
the statements were indeed the products of free choice.1"' According to the
Court,
[i]t is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose
other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmos-
phere carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical
intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity. The current practice
of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's most cher-
ished principles-that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate him-
self. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion
inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant
can truly be the product of his free choice." 1
Miranda took the Fifth Amendment privilege made applicable to the States in
Malloy, and broadened its scope to situations outside of criminal court proceed-
ings to protect "persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is cur-
tailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. 1 2
90. Id at 448-55.
91. Id. at 451.
92. Id (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 518 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 518-19.
97. Id. at 519.
98. Id. at 518-19,457.
99. The Miranda opinion consolidated the cases of Miranda v. Arizona, Vignera v. New York, Westover v.
United States, and California v. Stewart.
100. Id. at 457.
101. Id. at 457-58 (footnote omitted).
102. Id. at 467.
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According to the Court, the giving of an adequate warning as to the availability
of the Fifth Amendment privilege is so simple, and "a warning at the time of the
interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the
individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time."1 3
The warnings required by Miranda indicate that
[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.04
Thus, in the face of Miranda, until such warnings have been given in a custo-
dial interrogation situation, and unless the defendant waives his rights, then any
statements the defendant may make will not be admissible in court against him.
According to the Court,
[t]he Constitution does not require any specific code of procedures for protect-
ing the privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation.
Congress and the States are free to develop their own safeguards for the privi-
lege, so long as they are fully as effective as those described above in informing
accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportu-
nity to exercise it.1"5
C. Post-Miranda Decisions
Just two years after the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda, Congress enact-
ed 18 U.S.C. § 35011 as an apparent attempt to overrule Miranda."7 The
statute provided that in criminal prosecutions, confessions would be admissible
in evidence if voluntarily given." 8 Prior to the statement's admission, the judge
would determine, out of the presence of the jury, the voluntariness of the state-
ment, and then if he deemed the statement to be voluntarily given, the statement
would be admitted into evidence. 9 The jury would then be permitted to hear the
relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness, and the judge would instruct the
jury to give the appropriate weight to the confession. 10
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) provided the circumstances that the trial judge must
take into consideration in determining the statement's voluntariness.' That sub-
section provided that the circumstances should include
103. Id. at 468-69.
104. Id. at 444.
105. Id. at490.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968).
107. Dickerson v. United States, 580 U.S. 428, 436 (2000).
108. Id. at 435 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3501).
109. Id. at 435-36.
110. Id. at 436.
111. Id.
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(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making
the confession ... (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense
with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making
the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he
was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be
used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to
questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such
defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giv-
ing such confession. The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned
factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the
issue of voluntariness of the confession.
112
Subsection (e) of the statute provided a definition of the term "confession" as
meaning "any confession of guilt of any criminal offense or any self-incriminat-
ing statement made or given orally or in writing." '113
This legislation was part of the Crime Bill introduced in 1967 by President
Lyndon B. Johnson initially proposed to authorize large federal grants to state
and local governments for the training of new and existing police personnel and
improvement of law-enforcement facilities." 4 According to Kamisar, section
3501 "purported to overturn the Warren Court's two most famous confession
cases, Escobedo v. Illinois "' and Miranda, by providing that in all federal prose-
cutions any confessions 'shall be admissible in evidence if [they are] voluntarily
given."'"1" The statute appeared to reinforce the totality of the circumstances
test, but facially negated the Supreme Court's requirement in Miranda that
admissibility of a confession depended on whether or not appropriate warnings
were given to a defendant to ensure a safeguarding of the defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights.
After Miranda, the United States Supreme Court began to decide exactly how
Miranda fit into the law. In Michigan v. Tucker"7 the Court dealt with the issue
of whether a witness's testimony in the defendant's trial in state court for rape
must be excluded because the police had learned of the identity of the witness
through a Miranda-violating confession."' The questioning of the defendant
took place before the decision in Miranda, but the trial at which the defendant
was convicted took place after the Miranda decision."' On the defendant's
petition for habeas corpus, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan held that the witness's testimony was inadmissible and
112. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(e).
114. Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "'Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 883, 887 (2000).
115. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
116. Kamisar, supra note 110, at 888.
117. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
118. Id. at435.
119. Id. Incidentally, just one week after the Miranda decision, Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966)
held that Miranda was not to apply to cases in which the trials were commenced prior to the date of the
Miranda decision. See James B. Haddad el al., Criminal Procedure: Cases and Comments 82, n. 4 (5th ed.
1998).
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must be excluded. 2 The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the United States
Supreme Court reversed. 2 '
The facts in Tucker were as follows: On April 19, 1966, Luther White found a
woman in her home tied, gagged, partially disrobed, and who had been raped and
severely beaten. 22 The police arrested Tucker and brought him to the police sta-
tion for questioning, but before the actual interrogation, the police asked Tucker
if he knew for what crime he had been arrested, if he wanted an attorney, and
whether he understood his constitutional rights.123 Tucker replied that he under-
stood what he was arrested for and that he knew his rights, but did not want an
attorney.124 The police further advised Tucker that any statements he made might
be used against him in court, but they failed to advise him that if he could not
afford an attorney the court would provide him with one free of charge.12
Through the interrogation, the police learned that Tucker had been with Robert
Henderson and, later, at home asleep on the night of the rape. 26 The police con-
tacted Henderson to confirm the story, but Henderson's story discredited parts of
Tucker's statements.127 Over the objections of petitioner's counsel, Henderson's
testimony was admitted at the trial. Tucker was convicted of rape and sentenced
to 20 to 40 years in prison. 8
Tucker's sole complaint on appeal to the United States Supreme Court was that
the police did not advise him that he would be given free counsel if unable to
afford counsel himself.2 His argument relied on the Fifth Amendment right
against compulsory self-incrimination and the safeguards set forth in Miranda to
secure that right.13 He argued that "proper regard for the privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination requires .. .that all evidence derived solely from
statements made without full Miranda warnings be excluded at a subsequent
criminal trial."'31 In reaching its decision, the Court examined whether the police
conduct directly infringed on the respondent's rights or whether it violated only
the "prophylactic" rules developed in Miranda to protect that right.
1 32
With regard to the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion, the Court noted that "[t]he importance of a right does not, by itself, deter-
mine its scope, and therefore we must continue to hark [sic] back to the historical
origins of the privilege... "'I The Court noted that in more recent years, the
concern that compelled disclosures might be used against a person in a subse-
120. Id.
121. Id. at435,438.
122. Id. at 435.





128. Id. at 437.
129. Id. at 438.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 438-39.
132. Id. at 439.
133. Id. at 439-40.
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quent trial had been expanded to cases involving police interrogation." ' Prior to
Miranda, the issue in the cases was not whether the defendant had waived his
Fifth Amendment privilege but whether the statement was voluntary.13 It was
not until the decision in Miranda that the Fifth Amendment privilege was seen as
the primary protection for a person facing police interrogation.138
In Tucker the court did not hold that Miranda was constitutionally required. 37
it reiterated that Miranda presented measures that were not in themselves rights
protected by the Constitution but "were . . .measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination was protected."" According to the Court,
"[t]he suggested safeguards were not intended to 'create a constitutional straight-
jacket,' but rather to provide practical reinforcement for the right against compul-
sory self-incrimination." '139 The Tucker Court held that its determination that
Tucker's interrogation did not involve sufficient compulsion to breach the right
against self-incrimination did not necessarily mean that there was no disregard of
the procedural rules later set out in Miranda.4 The police conduct at issue in
Tucker did not abridge Tucker's constitutional privilege. 41 Instead, it "departed
only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to
safeguard that privilege."'42 According to the Court in Tucker, "the police conduct
here did not deprive respondent of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation as such, but rather failed to make available to him the full measure of pro-
cedural safeguards associated with that right since Miranda."'43 This was a sub-
stantive violation of the procedural rules set forth in Miranda. What the Court
had to examine here was the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule and the
penalizing of police error.1" According to the Court, the law does not require that
a defendant receive a perfect trial, only a fair one.14 Therefore, it stands to reason
that the law cannot require that police officers investigating serious crimes make
no mistakes whatsoever. 46  According to the Court, the primary purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful police conduct and "effectuate the
guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures."' 47 "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to
deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail-
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."1" This rationale, according
to the Court, should also apply to the Fifth Amendment privilege as well.'49
134. Id. at 441.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 442.
137. Id. at 444.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citation omitted).
140. Id. at 445.
141. Id. at 445-46.
142. Id. at 446.
143. Id. at 444.
144. Id at 446-47.
145. Id. at 446.
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).
148. Id. (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
149. Id. at 447.
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According to the Court, "[the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule nec-
essarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least neg-
ligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right."' 0 In refusing
to admit evidence gained as a result of this willful or negligent conduct, the
courts hope to instill a greater degree of care in the police officers toward their
handling of the accused's rights."5'
Important to the holding in Tucker is the fact that Tucker did not accuse him-
self."5 2 The evidence that the prosecution sought to introduce was not Tucker's
confession of guilt or even an exculpatory statement made by him. 3 Rather, the
testimony was of a third party who was not subjected to custodial pressures." '
According to the Court, it is unreasonable to believe that Henderson's testimony
is not trustworthy just because Tucker was not accorded the full measure of his
rights according to Miranda.' Here, the Court was only dealing with the testi-
mony of a witness whom the police discovered as a result of Tucker's voluntary
statements. 6 According to the Court, "[t]his recourse to respondent's voluntary
statements does no violence to ... the adversary system as may be embodied in
the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments."'57
The Court concluded its opinion by summarizing the holding in Harris v. New
York 5' that "a failure to give interrogated suspects full Miranda warnings does
not entitle the suspect to insist that statements made by him be excluded in every
conceivable context.'
5 9
In New York v. Quarles'60 the United States Supreme Court examined a situa-
tion in which public safety considerations trumped an officer's failure to provide
Miranda warnings. 6' The case involved a rape suspect who was subdued by
police officers while in a grocery store.162 The officers frisked the suspect and
discovered that he was wearing an empty shoulder holster. 3 After handcuffing
him, an officer asked the suspect where the gun was. The suspect nodded in the
direction of some empty cartons and responded that "the gun is over there. '"164
The officer found a loaded .38-caliber revolver, and then read the suspect,
Quarles, his Miranda rights.'65 Quarles indicated that he would be willing to
answer questions without an attorney present.66 The officer asked Quarles if he
owned the gun and where he purchased it, and Quarles answered that he did own
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At trial, the court excluded both the statement, "the gun is over there," and
excluded the gun itself because Quarles had not been read his Miranda rights.1"
The other statements about the gun ownership and place of purchase were also
excluded as evidence tainted by the prior Miranda violation.1"9 Despite the
State's argument that the exigencies of the situation justified the officer's failure
to read the suspect his Miranda rights, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
respondent was in custody within the meaning of Miranda during all questioning
and rejected the State's argument. 7 The court declined to recognize an exigency
exception to the requirements of Miranda because it found no indication from the
officer's testimony at the suppression hearing "that his subjective motivation in
asking the question was to protect his own safety or the safety of the public.. 7
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court concluded that "this case presents
a situation where concern for public safety must be paramount to adherence to
the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda.""2 The
Court began its opinion by examining the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination in its relationship to the Miranda decision. 73  It noted that the
Miranda Court presumed that interrogation in certain custodial circumstances
was inherently coercive and held that "statements made under those circum-
stances are inadmissible unless the suspect is specifically informed of his
Miranda rights and freely decides to forgo those rights." ' The Court conceded
that the New York Court of Appeals was correct in its decision that the facts of
this case fell within the scope of the Miranda decision.' There was no dispute
that the respondent was in police custody because the ultimate inquiry is whether
there is a "restraint on freedom of movement" to the degree associated with a
formal arrest.176 In this case, the respondent was surrounded by at least four
police officers and was handcuffed when the questioning about the whereabouts
of the gun took place.'77
The Court held that on the facts presented, that there was a "public safety"
exception to the requirement that the Miranda rights be read before the suspect's
answers to any questions would be admitted into evidence.178 According to the
Court,
[i]n a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these officers, where
spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily the order of
the day, the application of the exception which we recognize today should not
be made to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the
subjective motivation of the arresting officer. '79
168. Id.
169. Id. at 653.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citations omitted).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 654.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 655.
176. Id. (citations omitted).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 656.
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The Court went on to say that most officers if placed in the position of the
arresting officer in Quarles, would act from various motives including their safe-
ty and the safety of others.18 Regardless of the motivation of the individual offi-
cers in such a situation, the Court did not believe that the "doctrinal underpin-
nings of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which
police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public
safety.1
181
In Oregon v. Elstad82 the United States Supreme Court was faced with the
issue of whether or not the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause
requires a confession made after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of
rights to be suppressed solely because the police had obtained an earlier volun-
tary admission from the defendant made prior to the warnings.
1 83
In December 1981, the home of Mr. and Mrs. Gilbert Gross was burglarized
and items were stolen valued at $150,000.184 A witness to the burglary contacted
the local sheriff's office and implicated the respondent, 18-year-old Michael
Elstad, a neighbor and friend of the Gross's teenage son.' Upon this implica-
tion, Officer Burke and Officer McAllister went to Elstad's home with a warrant
for his arrest. 8 Officer Burke asked Elstad if he knew why the officers were
there to talk to him, and Elstad stated that he did not. 87 When asked if Elstad
knew a person by the name of Gross, Elstad replied that he did and that he was
aware that the Gross's house had been robbed.'88 Officer Burke told Elstad that
he felt that he had been involved in the burglary, and Elstad looked at the officer
and stated, "Yes, I was there.'' 89 The officers put Elstad in the police car and
transported him back to the Sheriff's headquarters where Officer McAllister
advised Elstad for the first time of his Miranda rights.19 Elstad indicated that he
understood the rights yet still wished to speak with the officers.' 9 ' Elstad provid-
ed a full statement to the officers indicating that he had known that the Gross
family was out of town and that he had been paid to lead several people to the
Gross residence and show them how to get into the house through the defective
sliding glass door.'92
At trial, Elstad moved to suppress his oral statement and his signed confession
claiming that the statement he made in response to the questions at his house "let
the cat out of the bag,"'' 3 and tainted the later confession as "fruit of the poiso-
180. Id
181. Id.
182. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
183. Id at 303.
184. Id at 300.
185. Id
186. Id,






193. Id. at 302 (citing United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947)).
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nous tree." '94 The Circuit Judge ruled that the statement "I was there," was inad-
missible because Elstad had not been advised of his Miranda rights at the time
he made the statement.19 However, the court chose to allow the written confes-
sion to be admitted into evidence finding that "[h]is written statement was given
freely, voluntarily and knowingly by the defendant after he had waived his right
to remain silent and have counsel present which waiver was evidenced by the
card which the defendant had signed." '196 Elstad was found guilty of first-degree
burglary and received a five-year sentence and was ordered to pay $18,000 in
restitution. 197
On appeal, the State conceded that the statement "I was there," was inadmissi-
ble as having been given without proper Miranda warnings, but the State argued
that any "taint" on the subsequent confession had been dissipated by
"McAllister's careful administration of the requisite warnings. '  The Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction concluding,
[r]egardless of the absence of actual compulsion, the coercive impact of the
unconstitutionally obtained statement remains, because in a defendant's mind it
has sealed his fate. It is this impact that must be dissipated in order to make a
subsequent confession admissible. In determining whether it has been dissipat-
ed, lapse of time, and change of place from the original surroundings are the
most important considerations. 99
The State of Oregon petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for review, but the
court declined."' The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consid-
er the constitutional issue. '
According to the Court, the Oregon court assumed that a failure to administer
the Miranda warnings "breeds the same consequences as police infringement of
a constitutional right, so that evidence uncovered following an unwarned state-
ment must be suppressed as 'fruit of a poisonous tree." 2 2 The Supreme Court
concluded, however, that this view is a misconstruction of the nature and protec-
tions afforded by the Miranda warnings and, as such, misreads the consequences
of police failure to supply the warnings.2 3 Thus, the Court did not believe that
Miranda was a constitutional requirement. "Requiring Miranda warnings before
custodial interrogation provides practical reinforcement for the Fifth Amendment
right."2 '





199. Id. at 302-03 (citations omitted).
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According to the Court, Elstad's argument that his written confession was
tainted by the earlier police failure to provide Miranda warnings and should be
excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree" assumed the existence of a constitution-
al violation."' The law is settled that " a confession obtained through custodial
interrogation after an illegal arrest should be excluded unless intervening events
break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession so that
the confession is 'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.""'2 6
However, a violation of the procedural rules in Miranda differs significantly
from violations of the Fourth Amendment to which the "fruits of the poisonous
tree" doctrine applies. 7 The exclusionary rule of Miranda serves the Fifth
Amendment but sweeps more broadly.0 8 The rule may be triggered even in the
absence of a Fifth Amendment violation.0 9 The Fifth Amendment itself pro-
hibits the prosecution's use of compelled testimony in its case in chief. 10 The
failure to administer proper Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compul-
sion; therefore, voluntary statements within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
if unwarned, must necessarily be excluded from evidence under Miranda." The
Court noted, however, that even though this presumption is not rebuttable for the
purposes of the prosecution's case in chief, it does not require that the statements
and their "fruits" be discarded as tainted." 2 According to the Court,
[i]It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to
administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other cir-
cumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free
will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and
informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.213
Even though Miranda requires that the unwarned confession must be sup-
pressed, any subsequent statement may or may not be admitted depending on
whether it was knowingly and voluntarily made.1 '
The Court held that the reading of Elstad's rights was undeniably complete.1 '
It was also without question that Elstad knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
to remain silent before he gave his statement as to his participation in the bur-
glary.216 Because the earlier remark was also voluntary within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment, neither the environment nor the manner of either "interrogation"
was coercive."'
205. Id.
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III. THE INSTANT CASE
A. Facts
Dickerson v. United States218 involved a suspect indicted for bank robbery,
conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm in the course of commit-
ting a crime of violence.219 Upon police investigation of the robbery in Old
Town, Alexandria, Virginia, at Dickerson's home, Dickerson agreed to accompa-
ny police officers to the FBI Field Office in Washington, D.C.22 The police
never placed Dickerson in handcuffs nor formally arrested him.221
When Dickerson and the agents arrived at the FBI Field Office, Special Agent
Christopher Lawlor and Detective Thomas Durkin of the Alexandria Police
Department questioned Dickerson. 2 Dickerson admitted that he had driven to
Old Town on the morning of the robbery to look at a restaurant, but he denied
any involvement in the robbery.223 Dickerson claimed that while he was in the
vicinity of the First Virginia Bank, he met an old friend who asked Dickerson to
give him a ride to Suitland, Maryland.224 Dickerson drove the friend to Suitland
where he dropped him off near a liquor store.22
Upon obtaining a special search warrant for Dickerson's apartment, Special
Agent Lawlor informed Dickerson that officers were about to search his apart-
ment.226 Dickerson then told Lawlor and Detective Durkin that he wanted to
make a statement. 27 Dickerson admitted that he had been the getaway driver in
a series of bank robberies and then identified Jimmy Rochester as the actual rob-
ber of the bank.228 Dickerson told the agents that on the date of the First Virginia
Bank robbery he and a friend named Rochester drove to Old Town, Alexandria,
and stopped the car near the bank.229 Rochester got out of the car and returned a
short time later and placed something in the trunk.2 Rochester then got back in
the car and the two drove away.' Dickerson also admitted that Rochester gave
him some dye-stained money and a silver handgun that Rochester feared the
police might find in his apartment. 2 After these statements, Dickerson was
placed under arrest.233
After Dickerson's confession, Rochester was apprehended by the police and
arrested.234 Rochester admitted to robbing the First Virginia Bank in Old Town,
218. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
219. Id at 432.
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Alexandria, three other banks in Virginia, eleven banks in Georgia, four banks in
Maryland, and an armored car in Maryland.23 Rochester said that Dickerson had
driven the getaway car in each of the Maryland and Virginia bank robberies.236
When searching Dickerson's apartment, the agents found the dye-stained money,
a bait bill from another bank robbery, a silver .45 caliber handgun, masks,
ammunition, and latex gloves.237
Dickerson was indicted, and prior to trial, made a motion to suppress the state-
ments he had made at the FBI Field Office on the grounds that he made the con-
fessions while being interrogated but prior to receiving his Miranda warnings.238
The District Court granted Dickerson's motion to suppress, and the Government
took an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.239 The Court of Appeals reversed the suppression order on a divided
vote.24 The Court of Appeals agreed with the conclusion of the District Court
that according to Miranda, Dickerson's statements were inadmissible. However,
the court went on to hold that the police in questioning Dickerson had upheld 18
U.S.C. § 3501,241 which reinstated the totality-of-the-circumstances test and,
effectually, overruled Miranda.242 The Court of Appeals concluded that the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona 3 was not a con-
stitutional decision and that Congress could by statute definitively legislate the
question of admissibility of voluntary statements made in the absence of
Miranda warnings."" The United States Supreme Court reversed.24
B. Opinion of the Court
The main issue before the Court in this case was whether Congress had consti-
tutional authority to supersede Miranda by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3501, the law
relied on by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.246 If Congress had such
authority, then § 3501 must prevail over Miranda 's requirement that warnings be
given to suspects.247 If Congress did not have such authority, then the applicable
section of the Code must "yield to Miranda s more specific requirements."2 '8
In deciding this issue, the Court examined 18 U.S.C. § 3501, enacted two years
after the Miranda decision.24 The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that




238. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
239. Id.
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241. 18 U.S.C. §3501 (1968).
242. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432..
243. 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
244. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432 (citing United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir., 1999)).
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246. Id. at 437.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 435.
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3501's express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of admissibility, its
omission of any warning requirement, and the instruction for trial courts to con-
sider a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to the circumstances of a confession.
" .,2"0 The Court cited several cases dealing with the authority of the Supreme
Court and the authority of Congress with relation to its legislative function.
According to the Court, the law in this area is clear."' The United States
Supreme Court "has supervisory authority over the federal courts, and we may
use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are binding in
those tribunals."2 2 The Court went on to reason, however, that "the power to
judicially create and enforce nonconstitutional 'rules of procedure and evidence
for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of
Congress.""'2 3 The Court conceded that Congress has the ultimate authority to
change, modify, or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence or procedure
that are not constitutionally required; however, Congress may not legislatively
supersede the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting and applying the
Constitution." 4 Thus, according to the Court, the focus of the instant case was
whether the Miranda decision announced a constitutional rule or "merely exer-
cised its supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of congres-
sional direction.
'255
The Court of Appeals held that because the Supreme Court had created several
exceptions to the Miranda requirement and has often referred to the Miranda
warnings as "prophylactic, ' 252 and that the warnings were "not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution, '257 that the protections announced in Miranda are
not constitutionally required.28 The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of
Appeals' holding that there is language in some opinions that supports this view,
but disagreed with its conclusion.5 9
The Supreme Court examined the Miranda decision itself and stated that
when Miranda went before the Court on appeal, the Court intended to "explore
some facets of the problems ... of applying the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for
law enforcement agencies and courts to follow."2 6 The Court noted, in fact, that
the majority opinion in Miranda is filled with statements indicating that the
majority intended to announce a constitutional rule.21' According to the Court,
"the Court's ultimate conclusion was that the unwarned confessions obtained in
250. Id. at 436.
251. Id. at 437.
252. Id. (citing Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996)).
253. Id. (citations omitted).
254. Id. (citations omitted).
255. Id.
256. Id. (citing Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653).
257. Id. at 438 (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444). See also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994);
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987).
258. Id. at 2333.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 439.
261. Id.
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the four cases before the Court in Miranda 'were obtained from the defendant
under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of
the privilege." 262 It was also noted that the Miranda Court's invitation for leg-
islative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimina-
tion further supported the conclusion that Miranda was constitutionally based.263
The Court emphasized that "the Constitution would not preclude legislative solu-
tions that differed from the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were 'at
least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in
assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it." 2 4
According to the Court, "Miranda is a constitutional decision."2 A major fac-
tor that the Court held as support for this contention is that in both Miranda and
two of its companion cases, the Court applied the rule in state courts and has
since that time "consistently applied Miranda 's rule to prosecutions arising in
state courts.""2 6 The Court noted that the only time that it may intervene in state
court proceedings is to enforce the commands of the United States
Constitution.267 The Court also noted that Miranda stated that "reliance on the
traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an
involuntary custodial interrogation."2 Something more than the totality test was
necessary, and therefore, § 3501's restatement of the totality test as sufficient
cannot be sustained if Miranda is to remain the law.2"' According to the Court,
[section] 3501 explicitly eschews a requirement of pre-interrogation warnings in
favor of an approach that looks to the administration of such warnings as only
one factor in determining the voluntariness of a suspect's confession. The addi-
tional remedies ... do not ... render them, together with § 3501 an adequate
substitute for the warnings required by Miranda."'
The Court of Appeals had noted that following the Miranda decision, the Supreme
Court made certain exceptions to its rule in cases such as Quarles and Harris v. New
York.271 However, the Supreme Court pointed out that it had also broadened the
application of the Miranda doctrine in cases such as Doyle v. Ohio272 and Arizona v.
Roberson."3 According to the Court, these decisions do not intend to purport that
Miranda is not a constitutional rule, but that "no constitutional rule is immutable." '274
262. Id. at 439-40.(citations omitted).
263. Id. at 440.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 438.
266. Id. (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990);
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988); and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 442.
269. Id. at 442-43.
270. Id. at 442.
271. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
272. 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (holding that the use of a defendant's post-arrest silence to impeach the defendant's
exculpatory story violates due process).
273. 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (holding that the rule that a suspect who has invoked his right to counsel is not sub-
ject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him also applies when a police-initiated
interrogation occurs in the context of a separate investigation following the suspect's request for counsel).
274. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
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In summary, the Court concluded that Miranda announced a constitutional rule
Congress could not legislatively supersede, and as such, the Court declined to
overrule Miranda.75
C. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Scalia
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the majority abused its
power in holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 could not overrule Miranda. According
to Scalia, to justify the result in Dickerson, "the Court must adopt a significant
new, if not entirely comprehensible, principle of constitutional law." '278 Scalia
argued that according to the "new" principle, Congressional statutes may be dis-
regarded, not only when what they prescribe violates the Constitution, but also
when what they prescribe contradicts a Supreme Court decision announcing a
constitutional rule."' According to Scalia,
[t]he only thing that can possibly mean in the context of this case is that this
Court has the power, not merely to apply the Constitution but to expand it,
imposing what it regards as useful "prophylactic" restrictions upon Congress
and the States. That is an immense and frightening antidemocratic power, and it
does not exist.27
Scalia reasoned that to justify the holding in Dickerson, the court must affirm
that "custodial interrogation that is not preceded by Miranda warnings or their
equivalent violates the Constitution of the United States." '279 However, a majori-
ty of the Court does not hold to this opinion, and therefore, the Court has acted
in plain defiance of the Constitution when it to section 3501 unconstitutional.8
Scalia argued that by imposing the Court-made code on the States, the court
has "convert[ed] Miranda from a milestone of judicial overreaching into the very
Cheops' Pyramid (or perhaps the Sphinx would be a better analogue) of judicial
arrogance." '281 Scalia held that the court should not allow even a celebrated deci-
sion to remain "on the books" when it stands for the proposition that the Court
has the power to impose extraconstitutional constraints upon Congress and the
States.282
275. Id. at 442.
276. Id. at 445 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 446.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 465.
282. Id.
[VOL. 21:55
SECURING LIBERTY WITH CHAINS
IV. ANALYSIS
A proper analysis of Dickerson v. United States283 and its place on the continu-
um of post-Miranda holdings begins with a look at how the past decisions by the
United States Supreme Court have analyzed the issue of the admissibility of con-
fessions. From cases as early as Bram v. United States, 84 the Supreme Court has
based its holdings concerning voluntary and involuntary confessions on the rela-
tionship of their voluntariness to the Federal Constitution. Prior to the 1960s, the
basis of admissibility of voluntary and involuntary confessions was whether the
admission of the confession violated the defendant's due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Any objections to "coerced" confessions including tor-
ture (which inherently deprived the defendant of due process) had to be raised
under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.
In Brown v. Mississippi 5 the Court examined the torturous methods used to
procure the confessions of the defendants and concluded that the use of these
coerced confessions for conviction purposes was a clear denial of the due
process rights inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.286
From Brown forward, several other Supreme Court cases dealt with the relation-
ship between involuntary coerced confessions and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. s7 In each of these cases, the Supreme Court applied the
due process totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine the voluntariness of
the suspect's confession. 88
In 1964 with Malloy v. Hogan289 the Court applied the Fifth Amendment pro-
tection against self-incrimination to the states. In Malloy, the Court re-examined
the early case of Twining v. New Jersey290 which held that the Fifth Amendment
protection did not apply in state courts. In Brown, the Court successfully distin-
guished between the state processes of requiring an accused to be called as a wit-
ness and testify and compulsion by torture to exhort a confession.291
In Miranda the Supreme Court based its holding on protecting the constitution-
al rights inherent in the Fifth Amendment. According to the Court in Miranda,
the issue concerned "the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual
who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for proce-
dures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
'292
The Court recognized that police interrogation in and of itself carries a cloud of
intimidation, and psychologically, that it has the potential of overbearing the sus-
283. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
284. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
285. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
286. See id.
287. The Court cites Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143
(1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
288. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434.
289. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
290. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
291. See Brown, 297 U.S. at 285.
292. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
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pect's will to the point of extorting an involuntary confession. Miranda seemed
to prohibit all pressure whatsoever on the defendant to confess-that in the
absence of these "warnings" no statement made by the defendant, regardless of
how voluntarily made could be admissible.
As noted earlier, cases decided after Miranda have often held that certain situ-
ations merit a departure from the guidelines set out in Miranda. There may be
times when it is acceptable not to have Miranda warnings given. But how is the
Court to reconcile its reasoning that because Miranda is not constitutionally
required,evidence obtained as a result of a violation of Miranda may be treated
differently than evidence obtained as a result of a constitutional violation? If
Miranda is in fact constitutionally required, then the departure from its holding
in several cases should have been constitutional violation. In Harris v. New
York, for example, the Court held that a prior unwarned statement, inadmissible
to establish the prosecution's case in chief, could be used to impeach the credi-
bility of the petitioner.293 In Harris, the Court was concerned with the possibility
of a defendant taking advantage of the Miranda shield by using it to justify per-
jurious testimony.29 ' The Court therefore decided that the contradictory state-
ments may be used for cross-examination impeachment purposes. If Miranda
were in fact constitutionally required, the Court in Harris should not have
allowed the unwarned statement for any purpose, including to impeach the
defendant's credibility. This would have violated the defendant's Fifth
Amendment right to protection from compelled self-incrimination since the
"purpose" of Miranda, if constitutionally based, would be to secure the Fifth
Amendment privilege. The purpose of Miranda warnings is to safeguard Fifth
Amendment rights. Impeaching the defendant's credibility with his own incrimi-
nating statement violates that right if Miranda is in fact constitutionally based.
Tucker presented another instance to the Supreme Court that appeared to con-
tradict the holding in Miranda. In Tucker, the issue again focused on the depri-
vation of the defendant's constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment. The
key to understanding the Court's decision in Tucker is the fact that Tucker's
interrogation took place prior to the Miranda decision, and his trial took place
afterward. According to the Court, prior to Miranda it had been well established
that the issue was not whether the defendant had waived his Fifth Amendment
rights but whether his statement was voluntary.2 95 It was not until Miranda that
the Fifth Amendment privilege was seen as primary.2 9 In the situation in Tucker,
there was no need to apply Miranda retroactively because there was not police
conduct directly infringing on the defendant's rights. Tucker's interrogation did
not involve compulsion sufficient to breach Tucker's Fifth Amendment right.
The problem in Tucker was that there was a procedural violation according to
Miranda in that the police officers failed to advise Tucker of his right to appoint-
293. See Harris, 401 U.S. at 226.
294. See Id. at 224.
295. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 441.
296. Id.
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ed counsel. However, since at the time of the questioning in Tucker the Miranda
decision had not been rendered, the inadvertent police error need not bar the
entire statement from the subsequent trial.
New York v. Quarles297 provided yet another instance where the Supreme Court
looked beyond its holding in Miranda, this time, to illustrate the reaches where
the Miranda decision could not go. The Court did not effectively abandon the
Miranda holding to consider the issue in Quarles. Instead, it examined the deci-
sion closely to determine the scope of the Miranda requirements. In Quarles,
the Court decided that when a police officer asks questions of a suspect in a situ-
ation where the safety of the officers or the safety of others is at stake, the doctri-
nal underpinnings of Miranda will not prevent the unwamed statements from
being admitted. The Court provided that there is a public safety exception to
Miranda, but this in no way interferes with the rationale behind Miranda if
Miranda was intended to only provide prophylactic guidelines to follow in assur-
ing that a defendant was apprised of his Fifth Amendment rights. However, if
Miranda were constitutionally required, as it now appears to be under Dickerson,
then this public safety exception would be a violation of a defendant's or sus-
pect's Fifth Amendment privilege.
In Elstad the Court revisited Tucker to determine the admissibility of a confes-
sion made after proper Miranda warnings but also subsequent to a prior admis-
sion before the warnings were given. The issue here was whether the unwarned
statement "tainted" the subsequent confession rendering it inadmissible.
Reaffirming its holding in Tucker, the Court again noted that there was no coer-
cion involved in the prior admission. It was entirely voluntary and as such did
not fall under the protection of the Fifth Amendment. The Court noted that there
is a presumption of compulsion if there is a failure to administer proper Miranda
warnings; however, this presumption does not require the statement and its
"fruits" to be excluded as tainted evidence.298 The Court looked at Elstad as
reaching beyond the sweep of the Miranda presumption and therefore subject to
the due process voluntariness test.
The problem with Dickerson is that it put Miranda in a box by officially mak-
ing the pre-interrogation warnings constitutionally required. The Court fell short
of this in Miranda itself basing the warnings on constitutional premises but
never formally making them a constitutional requirement. Instead, Miranda
made the warnings, whose purpose was to apprise a defendant of his existing
Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination, procedurally
required before any incriminating statements could be admitted into evidence in
court. The warnings serve a gate-keeping function for the admissibility of confes-
sions. What Miranda seemed to do was to make the act of confession itself seem
unacceptable rather than rendering compelled confessions alone unacceptable.2 99
"The Constitution is not, unlike the Miranda majority, offended by a criminal's com-
297. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
298. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307.
299. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 449-50 (2000)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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mendable qualm of conscience or fortunate fit of stupidity. '300 The gist of the
Fifth Amendment privilege is freedom from "compelled" confessions.
Compulsion connotes force. According to Scalia, "[t]here is a world of differ-
ence, which the Court recognized under the traditional voluntariness test but
ignored in Miranda, between compelling a suspect to incriminate himself and
preventing him from foolishly doing so of his own accord."3 1 Neither history,
precedent, nor common sense supports a conclusion that a violation of the
Miranda rules amounts to a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. 2
A problem with making Miranda constitutionally required is that Miranda
imposes more exacting restrictions on the Fifth Amendment privilege than actu-
ally exists. It seems from Miranda that for a confession to be admissible under
the Fifth Amendment, the confession must have been given by a suspect "dis-
tinctly aware of his right not to speak and shielded from 'the compelling atmos-
phere' of interrogation. 3 3 Further, Miranda eliminates all pressure whatsoever
on the defendant to confess "though it be only the subtle influence of the atmos-
phere and surroundings.""3 4 The Fifth Amendment, on the other hand, has never
forbidden of all pressures to incriminate oneself in the various situations it cov-
ers.30" However, there are sharp limits imposed by history and policy on various
incriminating circumstances. 6 "The [Miranda] Court's unspoken assumption
that any pressure violates the privilege is not supported by the precedents and it
has failed to show why the Fifth Amendment prohibits that relatively mild pres-
sure the Due Process Clause permits.'30 7
In the cases subsequent to Miranda, the Court has faltered in its attempt to
consistently enforce the requirement of Miranda warnings in every instance of
police interrogation. Yet, the Court in Dickerson itself said that since Miranda,
"we have consistently applied Miranda's rule to prosecutions arising in state
courts. 3 8 The Dickerson Court seems to suggest that the fact that Miranda has
been applied to the states in various situations means that the Miranda warnings
have always been constitutionally required. Federal courts can only step into the
regulation of state proceedings when a constitutional issue is involved. 9 The
Court surely would not have abused its power in enforcing Miranda upon the
several States if Miranda were not a constitutional requirement. Thus, with
Dickerson, the Court is simply officially stating what it seems to believe has
been the case since 1966-that Miranda warnings are constitutional require-
ments and, as such, are binding on the states.
300. Id. at 450.
301. Id. at 449.
302. Id. at 450.
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This reasoning places the Court in a dilemma, however. Dickerson cites a long
line of cases where Miranda has been consistently applied in state prosecu-
tions,31 but cases like Tucker, Harris, and Quarles illustrate a deviation from
the application of Miranda as a constitutional requirement. If, as the Dickerson
Court holds, Miranda is constitutionally required, then it is justified in applying
it to the States. However, the Court is not justified in establishing exceptions to
the constitutional requirement as it has with Tucker, Harris, and Quarles, among
others. There can be no exceptions to the Fifth Amendment protection against
compelled self-incrimination. If, on the other hand, Miranda is not constitution-
ally required, then the Court is justified in allowing exceptions to the "prophy-
lactic" guidelines set forth in its holding, but it has overstepped its judicial
authority by forcing the guidelines upon the States.
By officially making the Miranda warnings a constitutional requirement under
Dickerson, the Court has opened itself up to even more litigation. Can the Court
distinguish between a constitutional requirement and a constitutional violation?
Scalia is correct in his conclusion that the Court has created a new level of con-
stitutional protection, prophylactic rules that protect the constitutional right.
Scalia correctly notes that
[i]t takes only a small step to bring today's opinion out of the realm of power-
judging and into the mainstream of legal reasoning: The Court need only go
beyond its carefully couched iterations that "Miranda is a constitutional deci-
sion," that "Miranda is constitutionally based," and that Miranda has "constitu-
tional underpinnings," and come out and say quite clearly: "We reaffirm today
that custodial interrogation that is not preceded by Miranda warnings or their
equivalent violates the Constitution of the United States.
'
"311
Scalia places history and precedent aside and notes that "the decision in
Miranda, if read as an explication of what the Constitution requires, is preposter-
ous.3 1 2 There is no reasonable basis for concluding, for example, that a response
to the very first question asked of a suspect who already knows all of his consti-
tutional rights is anything other than a voluntary act.3 13 "And even if one
assumes that the elimination of compulsion absolutely requires informing even
the most knowledgeable suspect of his right to remain silent, it cannot conceiv-
ably require the right to have counsel present. '31 4 The suspect is not entitled to
the presence of counsel to tell him that he need not speak s.31 Essentially, the only
logical reason for having counsel present is to tell the suspect that he should not
speak, a job that the interrogators can surely do.31' The point of Miranda is to
310. Id., See cases cited supra note 267.
311. Id. at 446 (citation omitted).
312. Id. at 448.
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apprise the suspect of his right against compelled self-incrimination in custodial
interrogations. This right does not magically attach at the point that the Miranda
warnings are read. The Fifth Amendment protection exists apart from any "pro-
phylactic" reminders of its existence. If a suspect chooses to talk before the
warnings, then he has made a voluntary statement. If he chooses to talk after the
warnings are given, then he has likewise made a voluntary statement.
In the seminal cases decided subsequent to Miranda, the Court has more or
less emphatically concluded that it is more than possible-and quite common-for
police to violate Miranda without also violating the Constitution. 17
V. CONCLUSION
In an effort to promote an efficient enforcement of the criminal laws, Congress
drafted section 3501 two years after the Miranda decision, arguing that the
Miranda Court invited Congress to enact legislation in the field of voluntary
confessions because of the "widespread notion that Congress is better able to
cope with the problem of confessions than is the Court." '318 Section 3501 rein-
stated the pre-Miranda totality-of-the-circumstances test as sufficient for the
determination of the voluntariness of a suspect's confession. 9 The section com-
pletely omitted one of the Miranda warnings: whether the suspect was told that if
he could not afford a lawyer but wanted one, that one would be provided for him
before he was questioned. 2 Even more significant is the fact that section 3501
did not list any warnings nor require any; it only directs the trial judge to consid-
er certain factors when determining the voluntariness of a suspect's confession. 2'
Kamisar noted that
[s]till more important, although to somebody who has not read or reread the
pre-Miranda confession cases recently, the factors listed in § 3501 do look like
something resembling the Miranda warnings, they are not. They are not even
emanations from Miranda. They are simply some of the many components of
the pre-Miranda voluntariness test.322
The Court in Dickerson ultimately held that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was unconstitu-
tional because it was an attempt by the legislature to supersede the "constitution-
al" rule announced in Miranda.123 If Miranda is constitutionally required then
the Court has consistently allowed violations to the rule. Miranda never purport-
ed itself to be a constitutional requirement. While its foundations are a bit shaky
and the decision locks the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination
into a box, the warnings are only guidelines serving as tools to apprise an
accused of his rights-rights that exist apart from the warnings themselves.
317. Id. at 451.
318. Kamisar, supra note 114, at 909 (citing S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 46 (1968)).
319. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442-43..
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